URL :

Print Icon  Printable Page
Print Icon  Web Page

November 2002

Retrospective and Crystal Ball

Information Security revisits the voices of the past issues: authors, interviews and profiles

INSIDE:
   Jeffrey Schiller (January 1998)
   Philip Rothstein (December 1997)
   Charles Cresson Wood (November 1999)
   Jim Wayman (July 1998)
   Susan Landau (April 1998)
   Richard Smith (January 2000)
   Ian Hoenisch (September 2001)
   Stephen Cobb (April 1998)
   Richard Heffernan (April 1998)
   Jennifer Granick (March 2001)

section edited by ANNE SAITA

Jeff Schiller

January '98 SCHILLER said: On IPSec..."We have three choices for the future: either we don't consider security in Internet protocols and everything goes to hell in a handbasket; or we do less; or we just figure out some way to get more help in the security area. Well, we aren't going to let it go to hell or do less than what we do now. So, I guess we need to get more help."

Today, as when Jeffrey Schiller made this statement about IP security, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology network manager is area director for security on the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), a subgroup of the mammoth Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF).

Schiller built his alma mater's network in 1984 and has become one of infosec's most vocal and respected leaders. He's railed against numerous initiatives over the years, from the U.S. government's failed Clipper Chip that threatened private online communication to the chilling effect on security research under the current Digital Millennium Copyright Act.

His role in the IESG and IETF has given him opportunities to act as an advocate for more secure Internet protocols. The jury's still out on the extent of security's increased visibility within IP, but there's no doubt progress has been made.

"Five years ago, we had a terrible time getting protocol designers and software implementers to take security seriously," Schiller says. "No one could come out and say that they didn't believe in it, but they were not willing to put time and effort into doing it right.

"Now we are in a new phase. Designers and implementers want security, but they don't really know how to do it, so they want to ignore the problem and then get someone else to 'add security' later."

That approach is a mistake, Schiller says. "Unfortunately, security is not one of those things that does well when added later. And we don't have a lot of people in the security area to go around and fix every protocol."

What needs to be done now, he says, is to gain more of an industry consensus that security is necessary. People must be better educated so that stronger security is included in more protocols.

"I believe the IETF does better security work than most industry consortiums. Industry groups tend to look for the quick fix to the security problems that the papers are writing about. They don't tend to take as long a view as the IETF does."


Philip Jan Rothstein

January  '98 ROTHSTEIN said: On BCP..."Business continuity is not about elaborate documents or expensive software; it is about common sense. It is not about pessimism or cynicism; it is about being realistic, sensible and aware."

In one of Information Security's first cover stories, disaster recovery expert and frequent contributor Philip Jan Rothstein predicted problems for companies that don't have contingency plans to respond to natural and manmade disasters.

"Most of what I wrote five years ago still applies today. What's changed is 9/11, which brought a sense of reality not prevalent back then," says Rothstein, president of Rothstein Associates, a management consultancy and publisher focused on business continuity.

Nowadays, Rothstein is concerned about fallout in the next five years if business recovery services continue to consolidate, eliminating rivals and stifling improvements to methodologies and approaches through competition. Higher-priced software and services may result at a time when more people are considering such services. On the upside: at least disaster recovery is now on the radar.

"There are very few areas or departments of the typical enterprise that can afford to ignore business continuity, as was common five years ago," Rothstein says. "In other words, it's everybody's concern. It's no longer delegated to a specific niche in the organization."


Charles Cresson Wood

November '99 WOOD said: On CISOs..."The role of the information security officer (ISO) will change radically in the next year, in large measure due to the fallout occasioned by the Y2K problem."

Prolific author Charles Cresson Wood correctly predicted the role of the CISO would change dramatically at the turn of the century, but not because of the Millennium Bug. Instead, he admits, terrorist attacks on U.S. soil last September raised the security officer's role in government and corporate America.

"Certainly the visibility of the information security function has increased markedly," says Wood, a CISSP and security consultant in Sausalito, Calif. "And although the money hasn't shown up yet, it's clear this particular subspecialty within IT is getting its share of whatever increases there are in the IT budget."

The title CISO will increase in prevalence during the next five years, Wood predicts, as information protection becomes more critical to companies, particularly health care and financial services now charged by federal regulators with proving customer data is secure. "The more intensive the information handling, the greater the need for information and thus, in my own opinion, the higher the information security manager will be placed in the management hierarchy."

Proof of concept includes credit card company Visa, which now has a senior vice president of information security who reports directly to the firm's president and has influence on the business as a whole.

Wood hopes to see more information security officers reporting to top management through different corporate channels, such as legal departments or their own units. Having security officers work within IT can create conflicts, since IT managers tend to favor functionality and ease of use over security.

"I certainly favor moving the whole group out of IT and placing it in another group to get around the conflict of interest that has kept information security down and caused many problems," he says.

These days, Wood continues to wield his prolific pen, having authored more than 275 magazine articles and six books on information security.


Jim Wayman

July '98 WAYMAN said: On biometrics..."I think the industry has set up [a] negative perception, because it has claimed biometrics are foolproof in terms of identification for security purposes. That's the wrong approach. Number one, it's not foolproof. And number two, it really isn't for security--it's for convenience."

Jim Wayman's argument that biometrics is primarily a convenience was in response to a question posed in one of Information Security's first Q&As. Even now, the former director of the U.S. Biometrics Center says, "That's still a real good quote."

Wayman still works primarily with the U.S. government in biometrics, but has changed titles to the more academic sounding "senior fellow" at San Jose State University in California. He still believes tools such as iris and fingerprint scanners should be touted for their convenience, but admits Sept. 11 put increased emphasis on their security function.

"It's going to be hard to know how these technologies can be applied to increase national security. They might be an added tool, but it will require a lot more human intervention. We're not just going to turn these machines on and start catching terrorists," he says.

Because he works primarily for the government, Wayman says he was irritated with the way some biometrics vendors tried to capitalize on Sept. 11 by suggesting their technology could have prevented the terrorist attacks.

"No, the government didn't have this stuff in place, precisely because it had been working on it and knew its limitations and didn't find any value for the costs involved. The government has been on top of this; the government's position hasn't changed," he says.

That doesn't mean biometrics can't become a viable security solution in the future. "The jury is still out. We'd like to figure out if there's some way biometrics can be used for national security."

Wayman doesn't like to go out on a limb with predictions. At a government meeting in January 2000, he was asked if biometrics would be on weapons systems within five years. By then, the U.S. government had been researching biometrics for two decades, and his response disappointed the audience. In five years, he predicted, biometrics research would only be 25 percent further along.

Fundamental research remains key to unlocking biometric's future. Five years from now, he offers, "we'll be 20 percent further along than we are now."


Susan Landau

April '98 LANDAU said: On U.S. crypto policy..."There is no compromise. You either go with the availability of strong encryption and live with the consequences, or you try to outlaw it and live with those consequences."

Nearly five years later, Susan Landau is still unwavering in her position on the need for unregulated encryption. "Not only do I still believe it, but, more to the point, the U.S. government has decided that the availability of strong encryption is important to security," says Landau, who was one of Information Security's first Q&A subjects.
Today, Landau is a senior staff engineer at
Sun Microsystems devoted to cryptography, security and public policy.

In January 2000, the federal government changed export controls to enable the use of stronger cryptography in a number of products. "I'm delighted the government has come around to our viewpoint," she says.

Landau is optimistic that the government won't reverse its decision, as some in Congress have suggested in the wake of last year's terrorist attacks. That debate hasn't gone far, which Landau takes as a good sign. "The government understood the possible consequences when it made its decision, but also realized it was better off with the deployment of stronger encryption."

"Five years from now, we're going to see more and more security needed in computer systems, and that certainly argues for the use of encryption."


Richard M. Smith

January '00 SMITH said: On privacy..."More companies being caught will mean that more companies will be afraid to do it."

By "it," Richard M. Smith was referring to the predicted fallout from his discovery--and disclosure--that RealNetwork's RealJukebox and Microsoft gathered data from their users without them knowing about it. Smith's work helped bring online privacy to the national forefront, and online privacy issues remain a passion and cornerstone of his career today.

"Clearly, since 2000 there's been a lot of discussion about privacy issues with products. I think it has helped," Smith says from his office in Cambridge, Mass., where he is an independent Internet, privacy and security consultant. "I think companies are more careful about what they do in their products and think, 'Do we really need to be using this kind of tracking and surveillance?'

"On the other hand, a way that they deal with it is to simply disclose--tell people what they're doing. And that doesn't make me feel great, because what they usually do is bury it in an obscure license agreement that nobody ever reads. So, it's sort of a CYA type of solution to the issue."

Helping reduce such surveillance was the dot-com bust, which didn't occur until months after Smith's interview was published in Information Security. Many fledgling e-businesses believed money could be made by tracking people, but most went out of business. This shows the business practice was a bust. "The word is getting out that the whole idea of spying on people as a way to make money-i.e., target advertising--doesn't really work. People are backing away from those plans."

That doesn't mean invasions of privacy will disappear, or even decrease in the next five years. On the contrary, Smith expects Internet privacy issues to spill over into the real world as technologies make it easy to snoop. Electronic passes such as Fastrack tags will gather more than tolls, and global positioning systems will be embedded in more devices to track peoples' movements.

"I see wireless networks and the Internet sort of merging, and we'll start seeing privacy issues heading into the cellphone arena," he says. "Our lives will be watched a lot, and we're going to have a lot of the same fights we had with the Internet.

"That concerns me a lot. I see no good here."


Ian Hoenisch

September  '01 HOENISCH said: On DoS..."Denial of service is the scariest thing I'm afraid of at this point, because it's the most difficult to shield against."

When Information Security spoke with Ian Hoenisch a year ago, he was grappling with the threat of denial-of-service attacks at his Internet-based financial services firm ElephantX.com. 

Hoenisch was candid about his concerns, particularly how he'd confronted his biggest network fear: a flood of bad traffic that would force his company offline. He also was sold on his solution, Mazu Networks' TrafficMaster.

"I'd definitely use it again. We didn't have any damage caused by denial-of-service attacks within the time we used it," he says, noting that his company remained unscathed by last year's Code Red and Nimda worms.

Unfortunately, ElephantX didn't fare as well. Already suffering in a sluggish economy, business hit a screeching halt after 9/11, when customers decided to refocus on internal core business.

Hoenisch is now CTO for another company (which he declined to name) and is interested in the wave of bundled appliances that offer DoS mitigation tools as part of the package.

"It's a tricky problem because of its distributed nature," he says. "The Internet is still growing, and more hosts are being added. But I see a lot of mousetraps and building of smarter traps."


Stephen Cobb

April '98 COBB said: On malware..."Of the many threats to the security of our information systems, viruses surely must be the most annoying."

When Stephen Cobb wrote Information Security's first primer on malicious code, the floppy diskette was the biggest vector for malware infections. Nowadays, says the senior VP for research and education for ePrivacy Group, disk-borne viruses don't even come close to being as annoying as contemporary computer viruses.

"Viruses have evolved well beyond the headache phase to be a serious threat to companies, individually and in the aggregate," Cobb says. Virus writers' preferred method to spread malware is now e-mail and the Internet--a trend doomed to mushroom, as end users continue to embrace broadband connectivity. While antivirus vendors have made great strides in the war on malicious code, Cobb says more needs to be done in the next five years to stem the tide.

"If you do the right things with AV software, you're well protected," Cobb explains. "But an awful lot of people don't configure or install it properly, nor do they update. "We need things that can protect and defend systems automatically. That isn't being done at the moment."


Richard J. Heffernan

April '98 HEFFERNAN said: On secure storage..."Today's trash is tomorrow's news."

Richard Heffernan has been saying, "Today's trash is tomorrow's news" for years, including in an early Information Security article by David Beardsley on media protection. The founder of infosecurity consultancy R.J. Heffernan & Associates is concerned with the way we dispose of sensitive proprietary information.

"This is still as big a problem as ever," he says, noting that protections have shifted from hard copies to laptops and electronic data that isn't properly protected or destroyed. "As more and more companies become paperless, we'll need to make sure, as information moves electronically, people do more flow analysis for input and access and storage, and make it unrecoverable."

In the next five years, the problem will be aggregated by the proliferation of wireless networks, he predicts. Worse, many victims of information theft won't even know copies left on servers or downloads stored deep in systems have been pilfered.

"Information is the only asset that can be lost, yet no one knows it's missing," Heffernan says.


Jennifer Granick

March '01 GRANICK said: On defending hackers..."I'm an enabler, in the best sense of the word. I don't mean I want to promote criminal behavior. It's just the opposite: I want to promote [a] passionate search for knowledge... and teach how to do it right."

In January 2001, well before the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) was a household name among hackers, Jennifer Granick became clinical director of Stanford Law School's Center for Internet and Society. In an interview with Information Security, the criminal defense attorney expressed hope the Center would raise public awareness in technology legal issues, as well as providing legal assistance to accused hackers. And it's succeeding, she says.

"People are beginning to realize this area of the law is really complicated. Whether it's the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA or shutting down Napster, Grokster and peer-to-peer file sharing and things like that, people are beginning to realize the law in this area isn't necessarily just or good."

A troubling trend is what Granick describes as the "overprotection and 'over-propertization' of information."

"As we become an information society, we 'propertize' information; we give it the same kind of rules as personal property," she explains. "But the fact is, information is not personal property, and there's a real danger treating it as if it were no different than a chair or handbag."




November 2002 Table of Contents

Copyright 2002 TechTarget